While recent high-profile corporate governance failures in developed countries ha ve brought the subject to media attention, the issue has always been central to finance and economics. The issue is particularly important for developing countries since it is central to financial and economic development. Recent research has established that financial development is largely dependent on investor protection in a country -de jure and de facto. With the legacy of the English legal system, India has one of the best corporate governance laws but poor implementation together with socialistic policies of the prereform era has affected corporate governance. Concentrated ownership of shares, pyramiding and tunneling of funds among group companies mark the Indian corporate landscape. Boards of directors have frequently been silent spectators with the DFI nominee directors unable or unwilling to carry out their monitoring functions. Since liberalization, however, serious efforts have been directed at overhauling the system with the SEBI instituting the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreements dealing with corporate governance. Corporate governance of Indian banks is also undergoing a process of change with a move towards more market-based governance.
I. Introduction
The subject of corporate governance leapt to global business limelight from relative obscurity after a string of collapses of high profile companies. Enron, the Houston, Texas based energy giant, and WorldCom, the telecom behemoth, shocked the business world with both the scale and age of their unethical and illegal operations.
Worse, they seemed to indicate only the tip of a dangerous iceberg. While corporate practices in the US companies came under attack, it appeared that the problem was far more widespread. Large and trusted companies from Parmalat in Italy to the multinational newspaper group Hollinger Inc., revealed significant and deep-rooted problems in their corporate governance. Even the prestigious New York Stock Exchange had to remove its director, Dick Grasso, amidst public outcry over excessive compensation. It was clear that something was amiss in the area of corporate governance all over the world.
Corporate governance has, of course, been an important field of query within the finance discipline for decades. Researchers in finance have actively investigated the topic for at least a quarter century 1 and the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, himself had recognized the problem over two centuries ago. There have been debates about whether the Anglo-Saxon market-model of corporate governance is better than the bankbased models of Germany and Japan. However, the differences in the quality of corporate governance in these developed countries fade in comparison to the chasm that exists 1 Starting from the seminal "agency problem" paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) .
between corporate governance standards and practices in these countries as a group and those in the developing world. 2 Corporate governance has been a central issue in developing countries long before the recent spate of corporate scandals in advanced economies made headlines. Indeed corporate governance and economic development are intrinsically linked. Effective corporate governance systems promote the development of strong financial systemsirrespective of whether they are largely bank-based or market-based -which, in turn,
have an unmistakably positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction.
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There are several channels through which the causality works. Effective corporate governance enhances access to external financing by firms, leading to greater investment, as well as higher growth and employment. The proportion of private credit to GDP in countries in the highest quartile of creditor right enactment and enforcement is more than double that in the countries in the lowest quartile. 4 As for equity financing, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in the countries in the highest quartile of shareholder right enactment and enforcement is about four times as large as that for countries in the lowest quartile. Poor corporate governance also hinders the creation and development of new firms.
Good corporate governance also lowers of the cost of capital by reducing risk and creates higher firm valuation once again boosting real investments. 5 There is a variation of a factor of 8 in the "control premium" (transaction price of shares in block transfers 2 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . 3 See Claessens (2003) 4 See La Porta et al (1997) 5 La Porta et al (2000) signifying control transfer less the ordinary share price) between countries with the highest level of equity rights protection and those with the lowest. 6 Effective corporate governance mechanisms ensure better resource allocation and manageme nt raising the return to capital. The return on assets (ROA) is about twice as high in the countries with the highest level of equity rights protection as in countries with the lowest protection. 7 Good corporate governance can significantly reduce the risk of nation-wide financial crises. There is a strong inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and currency depreciation. 8 Indeed poor transparency and corporate governance norms are believed to be the key reasons behind the Asian Crisis of 1997.
Such financial crises have massive economic and social costs and can set a country several years back in its path to development.
Finally, good corporate governance can remove mistrust between different stakeholders, reduce legal costs and improve social and labor relationships and external economies like environmental protection.
Making sure that the managers actually act on behalf of the owners of the company -the stockholders -and pass on the profits to them are the key issues in corporate governance. Limited liability and dispersed ownership -essential features that the joint-stock company form of organization thrives on -inevitably lead to a distance and inefficient monitoring of management by the actual owners of the business.
Managers enjoy actual control of business and may not serve in the best interests of the shareholders. These potential problems of corporate governance are universal. In addition, the Indian financial sector is marked with a relatively unsophisticated equity 6 Dyck and Zingales (2000) 7 Claessens (2003) 8 . Johnson et al (2000) market vulnerable to manipulation and with rudimentary analyst activity; a dominance of family firms; a history of managing agency system; and a generally high level of corruption. All these features make corporate governance a particularly important issue in India.
Central issues in Corporate Governance
The basic power structure of the joint-stock company form of business, in principle, is as follows. The numerous shareholders who contribute to the capital of the company are the actual owners of business. They elect a Board of Directors to monitor the running of the company on their behalf. The Board, in turn, appoints a team of managers who actually handle the day-to-day functioning of the company and report periodically to the Board. Thus mangers are the agents of shareholders and function with the objective of maximizing shareholders' wealth.
Even if this power pattern held in reality, it would still be a challenge for the Board to effectively monitor management. The central issue is the nature of the contract between shareholder representatives and managers telling the latter what to do with the funds contributed by the former. The main challenge comes from the fact that such contracts are necessarily "incomplete". It is not possible for the Board to fully instruct management on the desired course of action under every possible business situation. 9 The list of possible situations is infinitely long. Consequently, no contract can be written between representatives of shareholders and the management that specifies the right course of action in every situation, so that the management can be held for violation of 9 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) such a contract in the event it does something else under the circumstances. Because of this "incomplete contracts" situation, some "residual powers" over the funds of the company must be vested with either the financiers or the management. Clearly the former does not have the expertise or the inclination to run the business in the situations unspecified in the contract, so these residual powers must go to management. The efficient limits to these powers constitute much of the subject of corporate governance.
The reality is even more complicated and biased in favor of management. In real life, managers wield an enormous amount of power in joint-stock companies and the common shareholder has very little say in the way his or her money is used in the company. In companies with highly dispersed ownership, the manager (the CEO in the [Box 1 about he re]
Common areas of management action that may be sub-optimal or contrary to shareholders' interests (other than outright stealing) involve excessive executive compensation; transfer pricing, that is transacting with privately owned companies at other-tha n-market rates to siphon off funds; managerial entrenchment (i.e. managers resisting replacement by a superior management) and sub-optimal use of free cash flows.
This last refers to the use that managers put the retained earnings of the company. In the absence of profitable investment opportunities, these funds are frequently squandered on questionable empire-building investments and acquisitions when their best use is to be returned to the shareholders.
Keeping a professional management in line is only one, though perhaps the most important, of the issues in corporate governance. Essentially corporate governance deals with effective safeguarding of the investors' and creditors' rights and these rights can be threatened in several other ways. For instance, family businesses and corporate groups are common in many countries including India. These range from Keiretsus in Japan and
Chaebols in Korea to the several family business groups in India like Birlas and
Ambanis. Inter-locking and "pyramiding" of corporate control within these groups make it difficult for outsiders to track the business realities of individual companies in these behemoths. In addition, managerial control of these businesses are often in the hands of a small group of people, commonly a family, who either own the majority stake, or maintain control through the aid of other block holders like financial institutions. Their own interests, even when they are the majority shareholders, need not coincide with those of the other -minority -shareholders. This often leads to expropriation of minority shareholder value through actions like "tunneling" of corporate gains or funds to other corporate entities within the group. Such violations of minority sha reholders' rights also comprise an important issue for corporate governance.
One way to solve the corporate governance problem is to align the interests of the managers with that of the shareholders. The recent rise in stock and option related compensation for top managers in companies around the world is a reflection of this effort. A more traditional manifestation of this idea is the fact that family business empires are usually headed by a family member. Managerial ownership of corporate equity, however, has interesting implications for firm value. As managerial ownership (as a percentage of total shares) keeps on rising, firm value is seen to increase for a while (till ownership reaches about 5% for Fortune 500 companies), then falling for a while (when the ownership is in the 5%-25% range, again for Fortune 500 companies) till it begins to rise again. 10 The rationale for the decline in the intermediate range is that in that range, managers own enough to ensure that they keep their jobs come what may and can also find ways to make more money through uses of corporate funds that are sub-optimal for shareholders.
Legal environment, ownership patterns and Corporate Governance
The legal system of a country plays a crucial role in creating an effective corporate governa nce mechanism in a country and protecting the rights of investors and creditors. The legal environment encompasses two important aspects -the protection offered in the laws (de jure protection) and to what extent the laws are enforced in real life (de facto protection). Both these aspects play important roles in determining the nature of corporate governance in the country in question.
Recent research has forcefully connected the origins of the legal system of a country to the very structure of its financial and economic architecture arguing that the connection works through the protection given to external financiers of companiescreditors and shareholders. 11 Legal systems in most countries have their roots in one of the four distinct legal systems -the English common law, French civil law, German civil 10 Morck et al (1988) 11 See the path-breaking set of papers, La Porta et al (1997 Porta et al ( -2002 law and Scandinavian civil law. The Indian legal system is obviously built on the English common law system. Researchers have used two indices for all these countries -a shareholder rights index ranging from 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) and a rule of law index India has 7.79 companies per million citizens, one of the lowest for English-origin countries but higher than many French-origin countries and Germany. As for the ratio of external capital to GNP, India has a score of 0.31 which puts it in the upper half of the sample.
The primary difference between the legal systems in advanced countries and those in developing countries lies in enforceme nt rather than in the nature of laws-inbooks. Enforcement of laws play a much more important role than the quality of the laws on books in determining events like CEO turnover and developing security markets by eliminating insider trading. 12 In an environment marked by weak enforcement of property rights and contracts, entrepreneurs and managers find it difficult to signal their commitment to the potential investors, leading to limited external financing and 12 See Berglof and Claessens (2004) ownership concentration. Topalova (2004) organizational forms that reduce transaction costs and asymmetric information problems.
Poor development of external financial markets also contributes to these ownership patterns. The effect of this concentrated ownership by management in Asian countries is not straightforward. Similar to the effects for US companies, in several East Asian countries, firm value rises with largest owner's stake but declines as the excess of the largest owner's management control over his equity stake increases. 15 In Taiwan, familyrun companies with lower control by the family perform better than those with higher control.
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Recent research has also investigated the nature and extent of "tunneling" of funds within business groups in India. 17 During the 90's Indian business groups evidently tunneled considerable amount of funds up the ownership pyramid thereby depriving the minority shareholders of companies at lower levels of the pyramid of their rightful gains. Affairs and SEBI to nail down the culprits have proved to be largely ineffective. As for complaints about transfer of shares and non-receipt of dividends while the redress rate has been an impressive 95%, there were still over 135,000 complaints pending with the SEBI. Thus there is considerable room for improvement on the enforcement side of the Indian legal system to help develop the corporate governance me chanism in the country.
Corporate Governance in India -a background
The history of the development of Indian corporate laws has been marked by interesting contrasts. At independence, India inherited one of the world's poorest economies but one which had a factory sector accounting for a tenth of the national product; four functioning stock markets (predating the Tokyo Stock Exchange) with clearly defined rules governing listing, trading and settlements; a well-developed equity culture if only among the urban rich; and a banking system replete with well-developed lending norms and recovery procedures. 24 In terms of corporate laws and financial system, therefore, India emerged far better endowed than most other colonies. The 1956
Companies Act as well as other laws governing the functioning of joint-stock companies and protecting the investors' rights built on this foundation.
The beginning of corporate developments in India were marked by the managing agency system that contributed to the birth of dispersed equity ownership but also gave This sordid but increasingly familiar process usually continued till the company's net worth was completely eroded. This stage would come after the company has defaulted on its loan obligations for a while, but this would be the stage where India's bankruptcy reorganization system driven by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) would consider it "sick" and refer it to the Board for Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR). As soon as a company is registered with the BIFR it wins
immediate protection from the creditors' claims for at least four years. Between 1987 and 1992 BIFR took well over two years on an average to reach a decision, after which period the delay has roughly doubled. Very few companies have emerged successfully from the BIFR and even for those that needed to be liquidated, the legal process takes over 10 years on average, by which time the assets of the company are practically worthless.
Protection of creditors' rights has therefore existed only on paper in India. Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that banks, flush with depositors' funds routinely decide to lend only to blue chip companies and park their funds in government securities.
Financial disclosure norms in India have traditionally been superior to most Asian countries though fell short of those in the USA and other advanced countries.
Noncompliance with disclosure norms and even the failure of auditor's reports to conform to the law attract nominal fines with hardly any punitive action. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in India has not been known to take action against erring auditors. For most of the post-Independence era the Indian equity markets were not liquid or sophisticated enough to exert effective control over the companies. Listing requirements of exchanges enforced some transparency, but non-compliance was neither rare nor acted upon. All in all therefore, minority shareholders and creditors in India remained effectively unprotected in spite of a plethora of laws in the books.
Changes since liberalization
The years since liberalization have witnessed wide-ranging changes in both laws and regulations driving corporate governance as well as general consciousness about it. Goswami (2002) Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes also submitted its own recommendations in 2001.
[ Table 1 about here]
A comparison of the three sets of recommendations in Table 1 The recommendations also show that much of the thrust in Indian corporate governance reform has been on the role and composition of the board of directors and the disclosure laws. The Birla Committee, however, paid much-needed attention to the subject of share transfers which is the Achilles' heel of shareholders' right in India. Figure 1 shows the frequency of compliance of companies to the different aspects of the corporate governance regulation. Clearly much more needs to be accomplished in the area of compliance. Besides in the area of corporate governance, the spirit of the laws and principles is much more important than the letter. Consequent ly, developing a positive culture and atmosphere of corporate governance is essential is obtaining the desired goals. Corporate governance norms should not become just another legal item to be checked off by managers at the time of filing regulatory papers.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Corporate Governance of Banks
Nowhere is proper corporate governance more crucial than for banks and financial institutions. Given the pivotal role that banks play in the financial and economic system of a developing country, bank failure owing to unethical or incompetent management action poses a threat not just to the shareholders but to the depositing public and the economy at large. Two main features set banks apart from other business -the level of opaqueness in their functioning and the relatively greater role of government and regulatory agencies in their activities.
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The opaqueness in banking creates considerable information asymmetries between the "insiders" -management -and "outsiders" -owners and creditors. The very nature of the business makes it extremely easy and tempting for management to alter the risk profile of banks as well as siphon off funds. It is, therefore, much more difficult for the owners to effectively monitor the func tioning of bank management. Existence of explicit or implicit deposit insurance also reduces the interest of depositors in monitoring bank management activities.
It is partly for these reasons that prudential norms of banking and close monitoring by the central bank of commercial bank activities are essential for smooth functioning of the banking sector. Government control or monitoring of banks, on the 26 Levine (2003) other hand, brings in its wake, the possibility of corruption and diversion of credit of political purposes which may, in the long run, jeopardize the financial health of the bank as well as the economy itself.
The reforms have marked a shift from hands-on government control interference to market forces as the dominant paradigm of corporate governance in Indian banks.
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Competition has been encouraged with the issue of licenses to new private banks and more power and flexibility have been granted to the bank management both in directing credit as well as in setting prices. The RBI has moved to a model of governance by prudential norms rather from that of direct interference, even allowing debate about appropriateness of specific regulations among banks. Along with these changes, market institutions have been strengthened by government with attempts to infuse greater transparency and liquid ity in markets for government securities and other asset markets.
This market orientation of governance disciplining in banking has been accompanied by a stronger disclosure norms and stress on periodic RBI surveillance. Greater independence of public sector banks has also been a key feature of the reforms. Nominee directors -from government as well as RBIs -are being gradually phased off with a stress on Boards being more often elected than "appointed from above". There is increasing emphasis on greater professional representation on bank boards with the expectation that the boards will have the authority and competence to 27 Reddy (2002) summarizes the reforms -era policies for corporate governance in Indian banks.
properly manage the banks within the broad prudential norms set by RBI. Rules like nonlending to companies who have one or more of a bank's directors on their boards are being softened or removed altogether, thus allowing for "related party" transactions for banks. The need for professional advice in the election of executive directors is increasingly realized.
As for old private banks, concentrated ownership remains a widespread Bank has seriously challenged that view and spurred serious thinking on the topic.
Conclusions
With the recent spate of corporate scandals and the subsequent interest in corporate governance, a plethora of corporate governance norms and standards have sprouted around the globe. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the USA, the Cadbury Committee recommendations for European companies and the OECD principles of corporate governance are perhaps the best known among these. But developing countries have not fallen behind either. Well over a hundred different codes and norms have been identified in recent surveys 28 and the ir number is steadily increasing. India has been no exception to the rule. Several committees and groups have looked into this issue that undoubtedly deserves all the attention it can get.
In the last few years the thinking on the topic in India has gradually crystallized into the development of norms for listed companies. The problem for private companies, that form a vast majority of Indian corporate entities, remains largely unaddressed. The agency problem is likely to be less marked there as ownership and control are generally not separated. Minority shareholder exploitation, ho wever, can very well be an important issue in many cases.
Development of norms and guidelines are an important first step in a serious effort to improve corporate governance. The bigger challenge in India, however, lies in the proper implementation of those rules at the ground level. More and more it appears that outside agencies like analysts and stock markets (particularly foreign markets for companies making GDR issues) have the most influence on the actions of managers in the leading companies of the country. But their influence is restricted to the few top (albeit largest) companies. More needs to be done to ensure adequate corporate governance in the average Indian company.
Even the most prudent norms can be hoodwinked in a system plagued with widespread corruption. Nevertheless, with industry organizations and chambers of commerce themselves pushing for an improved corporate governance system, the future of corporate governance in India promises to be distinctly better than the past.
28 Gregory (2000) and (2001) Box 1: Alternative corporate governance mechanisms
While corporate governance mechanisms differ from country to country, there are two broad categories of financial systems which differ in their very basic structure. These are the market-based system exemplified by the British and American systems and the bankbased system typified by Japan and Germany. Varying paths of financial evolution situate countries at different points in this market-institution spectrum with the ir positions determined by the nature of their economic endowments and the historical and political forces that shape their societies.
The market-based system or the Anglo-Saxon system, marked with effective distancing of ownership and control, trusts financial markets with the ultimate role of corporate governance. It is characterized by effective an all-powerful CEO, frequently also the chairman of the board of directors that barely accountable to a highly dispersed group of shareholders who generally find selling shares an easier way to express their dissatisfaction with inefficient management tha n creating a stir against it. Good performance and high share price are essential to keep future cost of equity capital low. The market for management control and the concomitant takeover threat then works to make sure that management does not lower shareholder interests. Block shareholders have relatively less power though financial institutions like pension funds do hold big chunks of stocks. Banks have practically no control over management.
Corporations in the bank based systems in Germany and Japan function quite differently. In Germany for instance, share ownership is less diffuse and banks play a much more important role as providers of finance and monitors of day-to-day activity. The board structure is substantially different with corporations being run by giant sized supervisory boards, Aufstichtsrat, about half of whose members are labor representatives. Management is carried out by another board, the Vorstand, appointed by and answerable to the supervisory board. The company has a very close relationship with its Hausbank, a universal bank that owns shares in the company and usually has board representation. The company can rarely take a major step without the consent of its Hausbank. The power (as well as salaries) of the top management is far less than that in the AngloAmerican model.
The Indian situation may be thought of as a combination of these two conflicting models. Though the basic corporate legal structure is Anglo-Saxon, share ownership is far less dispersed and financial institutions play a much bigger role in financing corporate activity. Share ownership and board representation of financial institutions give these bodies the abilities to serve as important monitors of management activities though the relationship. The powers, howeve r, are considerably limited as compared to those in typical bank-based systems and universal banking is not widespread. Nevertheless, financial institutions, have, in general, failed to fulfill even their limited role in corporate governance. g) The board should decide on the remuneration of non-executive directors and all remuneration information should be disclosed in annual report h) At least 4 board meetings a year with a maximum gap of 4 months between any 2 meetings. Minimum information available to boards stipulated.
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removal and remuneration of chief internal auditor.
f) Boards of subsidiaries should follow similar composition rules as that of parent and should have at least one independent director s of the parent company.
g) The Board report of a parent company should have access to minutes of board meeting in subsidiaries and should affirm reviewing its affairs.
h) Performance evaluation of non-executive directors by all his fellow Board members should inform a re -appointment decision.
i) While independent and non-executive directors should enjoy some protection from civil and criminal litigation, they may be held responsible of the legal compliance in the company's affairs. j) Code of conduct for Board members and senior management and annual affirmation of compliance to it. 
Disclosure and Transparency

